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Abstract
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association, currently in its fourth edition
and considered the reference for the characterization and diagnosis of mental disorders, has undergone various
developments since its inception in the mid-twentieth century. With the fifth edition of the DSM presently in field
trials for release in 2013, there is renewed discussion and debate over the extent of its relative successes - and
shortcomings - at iteratively incorporating scientific evidence on the often ambiguous nature and etiology of
mental illness. Given the power that the DSM has exerted both within psychiatry and society at large, this essay
seeks to analyze variations in content and context of various editions of the DSM, address contributory influences
and repercussion of such variations on the evolving landscape of psychiatry as discipline and practice over the past
sixty years. Specifically, we document major modifications in the definition, characterization, and classification of
mental disorders throughout successive editions of the DSM, in light of shifting trends in the conceptualization of
psychopathology within evolving schools of thought in psychiatry, and in the context of progress in behavioral
and psychopharmacological therapeutics over time. We touch upon the social, political, and financial environments
in which these changes took places, address the significance of these changes with respect to the legitimacy (and
legitimization) of what constitutes mental illness and health, and examine the impact and implications of these
changes on psychiatric practice, research, and teaching. We argue that problematic issues in psychiatry, arguably
reflecting the large-scale adoption of the DSM, may be linked to difficulties in formulating a standardized nosology
of psychopathology. In this light, we highlight 1) issues relating to attempts to align the DSM with the medical
model, with regard to increasing specificity in the characterization of discrete mental disease entities and the
incorporation of neurogenetic, neurochemical and neuroimaging data in its nosological framework; 2) controversies
surrounding the medicalization of cognition, emotion, and behavior, and the interpretation of subjective variables
as ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ in the context of society and culture; and 3) what constitutes treatment, enablement, or
enhancement - and what metrics, guidelines, and policies may need to be established to clarify such criteria.
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Introduction
Translated into over twenty languages, referred to by
clinicians from multiple schools, as well as by research-
ers, policy-makers, criminal courts, and third-party
reimbursement entities [1], the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion (DSM) enjoys a nearly hegemonic status as the
reference for the assessment and categorization of men-
tal disorders of all types - not only in the United States,
but increasingly in Europe and more recently Asia. To
be sure, the discipline and practice of psychiatry has
changed since the first DSM was released, and with the
fifth edition (DSM-V) currently in field trials in prepara-
tion for general release in spring 2013, there is renewed
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volume represents 1) a work of lessons learned from
prior editions, and in this way may be seen as an episte-
mologically iterative step in defining and characterizing
the often ambiguous if not enigmatic qualities of “men-
tal disorder(s)”, or 2) merely an embellished version of
previous volumes that perpetuates misnomers and vag-
aries and thus fails to be anything more than of nominal
value.
Whether endorsed as a reasonable gold-standard or
criticized as limited in scope and utility, what cannot be
ignored is the effect - if not power - that the DSM has
exerted, and continues to exert, both within psychiatry
and society at-large. Therefore, it is important to con-
sider if, and how the DSM-V will manifest impact in
and upon the character and conduct of psychiatry, med-
icine and the social sphere. Toward this end, we pose a
Socratic question - from where have the DSM and psy-
chiatry come, and to where are they going? Thus, this
essay seeks to analytically scrutinize - and contextualize
- the major developments that have occurred in various
editions of the DSM, focusing upon factors that moti-
vated its development in 1952, and the multiple changes
and repercussions various editions have effected in psy-
chiatry over the past sixty years. Inquiry to the history
of such a prominent standardized nosology of mental
disorders may be a means of probing (at least in con-
tours and highlights) the intellectual landscape of psy-
chiatry throughout the second half of the twentieth
century. In this light, three major “phases” will be
addressed: first is the period encompassing the formula-
tion and release of the first and subsequent second edi-
tion of the DSM; second is the period of the rather
‘revolutionary’ DSM-III,a n dt h i r di st h ep o s t - DSM-III
period to the present, during which the DSM-IV and
DSM-IV Text-Revised (DSM-IVTR) editions were
released. Particular emphasis shall be upon the develop-
ment of the DSM-III,a st h em a j o rt r e n d si te m b o d i e d
have been largely accentuated throughout all subsequent
editions of the manual.
However, it may first be worth noting one of the most
pervasive, yet often elusive characteristics of any histor-
iological recollection, including this one. Namely, that
by the very selection of key historical phenomena
deemed to be worthy of inclusion in any account, and
by the differential emphasis on, and chronological lin-
kages between the diverse components of such an
account, the final product is often far from being wholly
“objective” and\or comprehensive. We recognize this,
and acknowledge that such implicit tendencies may
indeed have affected the scope and tenor of the present
essay. Still, we hope to shed light on critical develop-
ments within and around the DSM throughout its his-
tory, and to attempt to make sense of this progression
through a didactic approach. We shall also attempt to
avoid cursory generalizations, by instead seeking a
leveled appraisal of multiple, if at times conflicting,
interpretations of the same historical phenomena.
A beginning: Nosological attempts culminating in the
DSM-I
Some of the first attempts to formally classify psycho-
pathology in the United States were undertaken during
the early nineteenth century. For the most part, such
efforts were collections of demographic data by the
Bureau of the Census, and were intended more for men-
tal health policy to regulate the treatment of the institu-
tionalized mentally ill, rather than for diagnostic
purposes [2]. Uncertainty surrounding the etiological
bases of psychopathology, and psychiatrists’ contention
that abnormal behavior involved complex, variable, and
often obscure interactions of internal and external fac-
tors, compelled formulation of a uniform nosological
system of acknowledged clinical utility (notable excep-
tions to such general uncertainties include the late nine-
teenth century association between syphilis and general
paresis, and the early twentieth century identification of
the link between vitamin B deficiency and pellagra) [3].
As the perceived role of psychiatry broadened to
include mental health beyond the boundaries of mental
institutions, interest in devising a viable classification
system for psychopathological conditions was strength-
ened within the psychiatric community. In 1918, under
the auspices of the Bureau of the Census and the
National Committee for Mental Hygiene, the American
Medico-Psychological Association (now the American
Psychiatric Association), first attempted the creation of
a formal, standardized nomenclature of psychopatholo-
gical conditions. These efforts culminated in the publi-
cation of the S t a t i s t i c a lM a n u a lf o rt h eU s eo f
Institutions for the Insane, what can be considered to be
the predecessor of the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders series. The volume included 22
diagnostic categories, most of which were psychotic con-
ditions associated with presumed somatic etiology. This
biologically-oriented classification approach, consistent
with then-dominant Kraepelinian constructs linking
abnormal behavior to organic brain dysfunctions, echoed
the nature of the psychiatric profession at the time: the
overwhelming majority of clinicians practiced in mental
asylums, where patient populations were predominantly
afflicted with severe mental disturbances associated with
conspicuous physical impairments and disease [2].
Nine subsequent editions of the Statistical Manual
followed during the interwar years, all of which empha-
sized the somatic viewpoint, offered relatively broad
categorizations of mental disorders, and were of limited
diagnostic utility. The psychodynamic approach (mostly
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the United States), which originated at the beginning of
the twentieth century but had maintained an initially
marginal role, ascended in dominance after the relative
successes of this approach in treating military patients
who suffered neuropsychiatric trauma [2]. Growing
recognition of the role environmental stressors in mild
psychological disturbances - “psychoneuroses” in the
verbiage of the psychodynamic tradition - expanded psy-
chiatrists’ role in treating the milder emotional and
behavioral disorders that were relatively common in
society at-large. The conceptualization of psychopathol-
ogy had largely shifted from recognizing mental condi-
tions as discrete disease entities distinct from mental
health, to considering mental health and illness on a
continuum of variable severity [4].
Psychodynamic theory gained rapid acceptance in
both the clinical and academic arenas of psychiatry, and
by 1946, was officially acknowledged as the leading
school of thought by the American Board of Psychiatry
[2]. Respective of changing conceptualizations of mental
disease, and a broadening of psychiatric clientele - both
of which being for the most part incompatible with ear-
lier nosological frameworks, the APA Committee on
Nomenclature and Statistics sought to create a new clas-
sification system: the first edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I),w h i c h
was officially released in 1952 [5]. This compendium
included 102 broadly-construed diagnostic categories
that were based upon psychodynamic etiological expla-
nations, and were accordingly subdivided into two
major groups of mental disorders: 1) conditions assum-
edly caused by organic brain dysfunction (associated
with somatic disturbances such as intoxication, trauma,
or a variety of physiological diseases), and 2) conditions
presumed to result from the effect(s) of socio-environ-
mental stressors on individuals’ biological constitution
and patients’ inability to adapt to such pressures [6].
The latter group was further subdivided into psychoses
- that is, those disorders constituting relatively severe
conditions such as manic-depressive disorder or schizo-
phrenia, and, at the other end of the scale, psycho-
neuroses, which included conditions such as anxiety,
depressive disorders, and personality disorders [6]. A
notable figure in the development and promotion of the
psychodynamically-oriented “maladjustment model” fos-
tered by the DSM-I was Adolf Meyer, a neurologist by
training, whose interests shifted to psychiatry upon his
move from Switzerland to the United States in 1892
[7,8]. While hailed as meaningful by its authors, the
DSM-I actually had only limited bearing on psychiatric
practice [9], although it did in fact set the stage for
increasingly standardized categorization(s) of mental
disorders, if not an implicit standardization of psychia-
tric approaches to diagnosis and treatment.
To compensate for perceived inadequacies of the DSM-
I, the second edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders was published in 1968, and
was still largely reflective of the psychodynamic tradition
[10], although this school of thought was already on the
decline by the end of the 1960s, and subtle amendments
made to DSM-II hinted (albeit somewhat inconspicu-
ously) at such change. Two major trends can be noted in
the content modifications to the DSM-II. The first was a
further expansion of the definitions of mental illness that
was arguably in line with a broadening of psychodynamic
theory to be more inclusive of milder conditions seen in
the general population. This was indicated by the addi-
tion of diagnostic categories such as “Conditions Without
Manifest Psychiatric Disorder” for “... individuals who are
psychiatrically normal but who nevertheless warrant
examination by a psychiatrist”, and “Transient Situational
Disturbances” for “... disturbances of psychotic propor-
tion ... when they are considered clearly transient reac-
tions to overwhelming environmental stress” [11]. The
second trend was an increased systematic categorization
and specificity that suggested a return to the Kraepelinian
tradition. This was evidenced by multiple subdivisions of
former disorder categories, such as the addition of eight
new “alchoholic brain syndromes”, an increased number
of “qualifiers” from four in the DSM-I to nine in the
DSM-II - namely, “acute; chronic; not psychotic; mild;
moderate; severe; in remission”, and the explicit advocacy
that clinicians “... diagnose every disorder that is present,
even if one is the symptomatic expression of another”
[11]. Yet another alteration in the DSM-II was the
removal of the psychodynamic term “reaction”, referring
to the maladaptive response of an individual to socio-
environmental sources of distress. A disclaimer accompa-
nied the announcement of such modification:
“Some individuals may interpret this change as a
return to a Kraepelinian way of thinking, which
views mental disorders as fixed disease entities.
Actually this was not the intent of the APA Com-
mittee on Nomenclature and Statistics: “[The Com-
mittee] tried to avoid terms which carry with them
implications regarding either the nature of a disorder
or its causes [...]. In the case of diagnostic categories
about which there is current controversy concerning
the disorder’s nature or cause, the Committee has
attempted to select terms which it thought would
least bind the judgment of the user.” [11]
While significant discrepancies existed between the
classification schemes of the DSM-I and the
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th revision
(ICD-6) of the World Health Organization (WHO), The
DSM-II And the ICD-8 were more closely aligned,
reflecting a collaborative effort between the WHO and
American psychiatrists sent to Europe prior to the pub-
lication of both the ICD and DSM manuals that same
year [11]. It is interesting that Spitzer was an influential
consultant to the DSM-II, a primary author of the “revo-
lutionary” third edition of the DSM, and chaired the task
force overseeing DSM-III development [12].
A “turning point” in psychiatry: The DSM-III
Negative critique of psychiatry mounted considerably
during the 1960s and early to mid 1970s; perhaps most
notable was Thomas Szasz’s 1961 challenge to the fun-
damental premise that all psychiatric conditions were
“true illnesses”, which by extension, cast skepticism
upon the legitimacy of psychiatry as a medical discipline
[12]. Moreover, the lack of clear demarcations between
mental health and illness, and the relatively low reliabil-
ity of psychiatric diagnoses, were sharply criticized both
within the psychiatric community and from without
[13]. In addition to the rising discontent towards psy-
chodynamic psychiatry was a significant restriction of
resource funding. Diminished research support from the
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), and
reduced resource allocations by the federal government
and insurance providers were prevalent throughout the
1970s, based, at least in part, upon the perception that
psychodynamic psychiatry’s lack of uniformity in classifi-
cation fostered non-rigorous investigations, and super-
fluous healthcare expenditures [12,14]. In particular,
psychiatrists’ non- medically licensed competitors (e.g.-
psychologists, social workers, and counselors) were
offering psychodynamically-based therapeutic services at
significantly less expensive rates, and this challenged the
psychiatric community to prove that its diagnoses and
therapies were (more) efficacious and represented treat-
ment of legitimate medical diseases [14]. Concomitantly,
a neo-Kraepelinian “invisible college” of more biologi-
cally-oriented psychiatrists increasingly and more
ardently criticized psychodynamically-oriented psychia-
tric research and practice [13].
Substantive advances in psychometric instruments for
quantitative psychiatric assessment, such as rating scales
and checklists for anxiety andd e p r e s s i o n ,h a db e c o m e
something of a standard in mental health research and
practice. Progress in therapeutics had also ensued, with
increasingly more efficient behavioral and brief psy-
chotherapeutic approaches [13], and notably, progress in
psychopharmacology, which by the 1960s had developed
a significant armamentarium of mood- and behavior-
altering agents [15]. In fact, by the mid 1970s, prescrib-
ing psychotropic medications had become de rigueur for
much of psychiatric practice [16]. Posturing against the
challenges facing psychiatry, the research community
engaged series of responses; among the most significant
being 1) a 1965 conference addressing psychiatric classi-
fication that was sponsored by the Psychopharmacology
Research Branch of the NIMH, 2) the formulation of
the Washington University criteria for operational diag-
nosis in the early 1970s, and 3) the development of the
Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) by the NIMH Psy-
chobiology of Depression Collaborative Study, in 1978
[17]. Thus, a multitude of factors created a propitious
climate for change that culminated in the publication of
the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders in 1980 [18].
Many of the modifications incorporated into the
DSM-III constituted a veritable paradigm shift in psy-
chiatry. Perhaps the most telling feature of this trend
was the official removal of the psychodynamic term
“neurosis”. Confronted by an outcry from psychodyna-
mically-oriented psychiatrists, the decision to ban the
term from the DSM was only mildly amended: the
DSM-III’s Nomenclature Task Force eventually decided
to include the term parenthetically as “neurotic disor-
der” after renaming mental disorder categories that cor-
responded to the earlier “neurosis” classifications.
Additionally, an explanation of the distinction between
“neurosis” as an etiological explanation, and the expres-
sion “neurotic disorder” a sad i s c r e t ee n t i t yw a su n d e r -
scored in the Introduction of the DSM-III [19]. This
decision involved a categorical reorganization of many
of the disorders previously conceptualized in psychody-
namic terminology.
The increased number of mental disorder categories
(from 182 in the DSM-II to 265 in the DSM-III)w a s
posed to reflect the increase in psychiatric knowledge
accrued since the DSM-II, as well as amplification in the
specificity of and in diagnosis sought by the DSM-III
Task Force. The latter often entailed ramifications from
previous, more broadly construed categories into several
individual “subtypes”, each considered as a separate and
discrete mental disorder. For instance, the number of
disorders under the umbra of Schizophrenia changed
from 14 categories in the DSM-II to 18 in the DSM-III.
Several single disorders were divided into a number of
distinct categories; for example, the DSM-II category
“Specific Learning Disturbance” was divided into five
different “Specific Developmental Disorders”,t h ec a t e -
gory “Tic” gave way to three distinct “Stereotyped
Movement Disorders,” and the single category “Feeding
Disturbance” was replaced by four specific “Eating Dis-
orders”. This trend of subdivision and reclassification
was most pronounced, however, for the categories pre-
viously classified as “neuroses”. For instance, three
classes of “Hysterical Neurosis” in the DSM-II gave way
Kawa and Giordano Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2012, 7:2
http://www.peh-med.com/content/7/1/2
Page 4 of 9to six renamed “daughter disorders” in the DSM-III. The
single category “Phobic Neurosis” was divided into five
classes of “Phobic Disorders“, and the single category
“Depressive Neurosis” was substituted by four categories
of “Major Depression” [20].
Additionally, many novel disorder categories (that
were absent in the DSM-II) were formalized as mental
illness in the DSM-III. These included Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, an array of childhood and adolescence
disorders (such as three categories of Attention-Deficit
Disorder), seven classes of “Psychosexual Dysfunctions”,
and four “Disorders of Impulse Control Not Elsewhere
Classified” (such as “Pathological Gambling”). Contro-
versy has arisen over the legitimacy of several of these
categories as “true illnesses” since their incorporation in
the DSM-III and perpetuation in successive editions of
the DSM-IV.
One of the amendments that was of greatest impact
was the permanent removal of the category “Homosexu-
ality” from the DSM-II. The change was originally made
upon the publication of the seventh printing of the DSM-
II in 1973, following a vote by the American Psychiatric
Association earlier that year [14]. The decision was pro-
vocative (if not controversial) within camps of both advo-
cacy and antagonism: in the former because it was
contended (and in retrospect rightly so) that the earlier
classifications of homosexuality-as-disorder were largely
shaped by politically and socio-culturally contingent
notions of deviance, rather than scientific corroboration
[13], and in the latter because it was claimed that the
change was based on consensus between figures repre-
senting “expert opinion” and Gay Rights’ lobbying efforts.
In addition to content modifications, several other
novel features of the DSM-III merit mention. Specifi-
cally, elaborate and more explicitly defined operational
criteria for inclusion and exclusion were formulated for
each disorder. These included standards for differential
diagnosis of several categories of disorder that share
similar characteristics, and the minimum duration of
signs and symptoms required for a clinical diagnosis to
be made. Another unique feature of the DSM-III was
the adoption of a “multi-axial system” of diagnosis to
account for patients’ multi-factorial presentation and
multi-dimensional experience of mental illness, and to
facilitate a more comprehensive depiction of the
patient’s condition [21]. Finally, prior to adoption, the
diagnostic categories developed in the DSM-III were
subjected to NIMH-sponsored field trials between Sep-
tember 1977 and September 1979 in order to assess
inter-rater reliability. While not compared to inter-rater
agreement(s) on earlier nosologies, the DSM-III classifi-
cation system was reported to have relatively good diag-
nostic reliability [11,22].
Taken together, the multiple amendments introduced
to the DSM-III demonstrate a shift in the conceptualiza-
tion of mental disorders from psychological “states” to
discrete, operationally defined disease categories, and a
return to a descriptive, symptom-based classification. In
essence, the DSM-III inaugurated an attempt to “re-
medicalize” American psychiatry.
Repercussions
The release of the DSM-III in 1980 has been perceived
as a nothing short of a momentous phenomenon. The
APA’s executive officer Melvin Sabshin heralded it as
the victory of “science over ideology” [23], and Gerald
Klerman, a leading psychiatrist at the time of the DSM-
III’s inception, termed its development a “fateful turning
point in the history of the American psychiatric profes-
sion” [24]. Effects of the DSM-III rapidly pervaded psy-
chiatric practice, research, and teaching. As early as
1982, Klerman asserted that “... there is not a textbook
of psychology or psychiatry that does not use DSM-III
as the organizing principle for its table of contents and
for classification of psychopathology”.I nf a c t ,a sY o u n g
has stated, “American medical schools and residency
programs routinely expected students and physicians to
pass examinations based on DSM-III criteria. [...] Both
referees and journal editors expected manuscripts sub-
mitted to scholarly journals to be written in its language,
and it was simply assumed that psychiatric research pro-
posals would conform to its conventions” [25].
In an appraisal of the DSM-III a mere six years after
its publication, Klerman noted a number of repercus-
sions within several schools of thought in psychiatric
research and clinical practice. Klerman claimed that the
DSM-III had provided a formal common language that
facilitated communication between multiple mental
health professionals. While contending that the DSM-III
had not become “the final consensus” with which to
unify divergent perspectives regarding psychopathology,
he acknowledged the “increasing acceptance of this diag-
nostic framework as the basis for teaching and research”
[13]. Even proponents of the psychodynamic tradition,
some of DSM-II’s major critics, gained a greater appre-
ciation for the manual’s classification system, while hop-
ing for the addition of another “Axis” that would be
more aligned with psychodynamic theory in the next
edition of the DSM-III (an aspiration which, while expli-
citly suggested to the DSM-III’s Task Force and tenta-
tively agreed upon by Spitzer and colleagues, never
actually materialized) [13]. Indeed, while a torrent of cri-
ticism met the publication of the DSM-III,t h e“revolu-
tion” it fostered was quick and its effects durable, and
psychiatrists who wished to retain their roles and cred-
i b i l i t yi nt h ef i e l ds o o nh a dt oc o n f o r mt oi t sn e w l y
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disorders [14].
The delineation of operationally defined diagnostic
categories for mental disorders incurred a surge in epi-
demiological morbidity studies. Perhaps the most signifi-
cant was the NIMH Epidemiological Catchment Area
Project, which sought to assess the incidence and preva-
lence of mental disorders, as classified by the DSM-III,
within the United States’ general population [26].
Furthermore, while the DSM-III classification system did
not explicitly link diagnostic categories to any particular
treatment options, the symptom-based, somatically-
oriented nature of the classification scheme was particu-
larly compatible with biological therapies customized to
discretely constructed disease entities. For any medica-
tion to be approved by the FDA, a drug needs to be
proven effective in the treatment of a specific disease
[14]. The clear demarcation of standardized, purportedly
more reliable psychopathological diagnostic categories
thus provided researchers, and pharmaceutical compa-
nies, an incentive to launch randomized controlled trials
(RCT) to test newly developed psychopharmacological
agents in the treatment of specific DSM-III disorders
[14]. In the years following the publication of the DSM-
III, billions of dollars were allocated by the government
and pharmaceutical companies for psychopharmacologi-
cal research [27]. For example, during the 1980s, the
federal research budget allocated to the NIMH increased
by 84 percent, to about $484 million annually [28].
Insurance providers equally welcomed the arrival of the
new nosology, and adopted the DSM-III (and its subse-
quent editions) as the standard diagnostic categorization
upon which to base reimbursement of therapeutic mod-
alities (particularly, psychopharmacologic interventions)
[14].
After DSM-III: Accentuation of the “revolutionary
textbook’s” orientation?
Subsequent editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders all displayed characteristics
that are congruent with the orientation of the DSM-III.
The number of categories of disorders has increased
from 265 disorders in the DSM-III, to 292 in the DSM-
III-R, to 297 in the DSM-IV [6,10,18,29-31]. The trend
toward enhanced specificity of operational criteria has
likewise become more pronounced throughout succes-
sive editions of the DSM, and information regarding
prevalence, age- and sex -differential characteristics, and
co-morbidity with other disorders has been added and
regularly updated since the DSM-III-R. The significant
increase in epidemiological studies based upon DSM cri-
teria following the publication of the DSM-III has
allowed for the incorporation of empirical data into the
classification of several disorders [18,29-32]. Additions
to the DSMs have also included information gathered
from studies of the pathophysiology of mental disorders,
and most recently have included data obtained from and
based upon neuroimaging studies. The trend toward
increased subdivisions of disorders that was originally
initiated in the DSM-III has been evident in all subse-
quent editions of the manual. For instance, the eight
categories of “Psychosexual Dysfunctions” in the DSM-
III evolved to ten categories of “Sexual Dysfunctions” in
the DSM-III-R, and to seventeen different “Sexual Dys-
function” classes in the DSM-IV and its text revised edi-
tion, the DSM-IV-TR [18,29-31]. Other major
amendments included the incorporation of a section
dealing with “Culture-bound Syndromes” in the DSM-IV
and DSM-IV-TR, thereby acknowledging cultural varia-
bility in the ways that mental health and illness are
expressed and construed [30,31]. In all, the changes to
editions of the DSM following the DSM-III have essen-
tially revolved around an accentuation of a “medicaliz-
ing” trend in psychiatry.
Rogler has attempted to interpret the increasing size
and complexity of the DSM since its first edition until
the DSM-IV, and has identified five major changes in its
evolution; these are: 1) a theoretical shift in the concep-
tualization of mental disorders from a bio-psychosocial
model to a research-oriented, medical model; 2) devel-
opment of the multi-axial diagnostic system that facili-
tated a rise in biomedical findings based upon the five
axes and the relation(s) between them; 3) the inclusion
of new disorders and expansion of previously defined
disorders; 4) a “lateral” reorganization of disorders into
discrete, broad categories that entailed merging a num-
ber of disorders and eliminating others; and 5) a neo-
Kraepelinian paradigm shift that was first evidenced in
the DSM-III, that reinforced the descriptive, somatic
orientation that then became the norm in all subsequent
DSMs [33]. Indeed, this last point is important, as Rog-
ler’s analysis highlighted the iterative dominance of the
medical model since the DSM-III - and, in parallel, the
growth of this model in throughout almost all of psy-
chiatric practice, education, and training.
At present, field trials of the DSM-V are underway,
and the objectives outlined in “A Research Agenda for
DSM-V“ (2002) are largely concordant with the trends
observed throughout the manual’s evolution. Of particu-
lar interest is the continuing emphasis on the (at least
implicit) incorporation of biological data into the classi-
fication of disorders in the DSM, with the intended ela-
boration of findings from studies in behavioral genetics
and neuroimaging in the disorder classifications in the
DSM-V.H o w e v e r ,t h eManual does not explicitly spe-
cify what and how neurogenetic, neuroimaging, and
neurochemical data can or should be employed in estab-
lishing differential diagnoses of mental disorders.
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experimental neuroscientific and neurotechnological
methods for diagnostic purposes is not without conten-
tion and has become the focus of considerable neu-
roethical debate (see [34] for overview).
Critical deliberations
The history of the DSM series may certainly be viewed
as an attempt to integrate scientific progress to the cate-
gorization of psychopathology, thereby reflecting an
increased epistemological capital, and compelling psy-
chiatric diagnoses to be better aligned with the medical
model. Yet, while elaboration of a standardized nosology
for mental disorders may have afforded a major impetus
for research on psychopathology, it has also generated
particular problems, abuses and possibly unforeseen
consequences in the manner in which psychiatric distur-
bances are understood, diagnosed, and treated [35].
Perhaps one of the most striking corollaries of the
symptom-based, somatically-oriented descriptive
approach fostered by the DSM-III is the increase in psy-
chopharmacological interventions, applied to conditions
ranging from the severest of mental disorders to much
milder DSM categories that had previously been treated
with psychotherapeutic and behavioral approaches.
Research in the neurochemistry and pharmacology of
specifically defined psychopathological conditions has
enabled the pharmaceutical industry to develop drugs
targeting biological markers associated with such condi-
tions. While this has led to the relatively successful
treatment of a number of neuropsychiatric conditions
(e.g., anxiety, depression, certain forms of psychosis) and
provided appreciable therapeutic benefit to scores of
patients, the pharmacological approach has been less
than wholly successful in the treatment of other psy-
chiatric conditions (e.g., type I bipolar disorder, schizo-
phrenia, personality disorders). As well, the potential for
misusing the pharmaceutical approach has been decried
by several critics [36-39], and the phenomenon of “dis-
ease mongering” has been noted in the marketing of
various drugs (e.g.- the selective serotonin reuptake inhi-
bitors, SSRIs) for such conditions as “mild social anxi-
ety”, which is been described as a “medicalization of
shyness” [36]. Similarly, the medicalization of cognition,
emotion, and behavior has also generated discourse- if
not controversy- about the interpretation of subjective
variables, such as what constitutes “normal” or “optimal”
function within the context and expectations of society
and culture [40].
In this light, the broadening categorization of mental
disorders, both in terms of what constitutes “un-health”,
and who may be a target of psychopharmacological
intervention (including young children), has paralleled
the increase in the number of individuals considered to
possess a mental illness [41]. The perplexing conclusion
drawn from a recent National Comorbidity Survey for
mental disorders in the United States asserts that: “...
about half of Americans will meet the criteria or a
DSM-IV disorder sometime in their life, with first onset
usually in childhood or adolescence. Interventions
aimed at prevention or early treatment need to focus on
youth” [42], and this prompts a renewed interest in
questions of what constitutes treatment, enablement, or
enhancement- and what metrics, guidelines, and policies
need to be established to clarify such criteria [40,43].
Problematic issues arising in psychiatry, arguably
reflecting the large-scale adoption of the DSM,m a yb e
linked to the difficulties of formulating a standardized
nosology of psychopathology. Charles Rosenberg has
posited that the formulation of standardized and clearly
delineated diagnostic classifications, based on the con-
ceptualization of dysfunctions as discrete disease enti-
ties, serves to legitimize existence of named and defined
disease(s), and can obscure the ‘constructedness’ of the
categories themselves [44]. It may be worth pondering
the extent to which such a phenomenon could be parti-
cularly problematic with regard to a number of beha-
vioral and emotional conditions that might be mere
extensions of normal behavior or simple “eccentricities”
that would then construed as medical diseases. The
“pathologization of deviance” and the “medicalization of
social ills” are potential effects of psychiatric diagnoses
and treatment trends. While such categorizations may
arise from, and be directed toward benevolent inten-
tions, caution is required to insure against socio-political
usurpation of these diagnoses, and repetition of histori-
cal instances of bastardization of medicine by capricious
agenda [45-49].
Conclusion
The history of the DSM has been characterized by a
shift in the conceptualization of mental health and ill-
ness, reflecting an attempt to adhere to the ontological
claims and canon of “biomedicine” and sustain psychia-
try’s medical identity. The evolution of the DSM illus-
trates that what is considered to be “medical” and
“scientific” is often not an immutable standard, but
rather, may be variable across time and culture, and in
this way contingent upon changes in dominant schools
of thought. The elaboration of a standardized nosology
of mental disorders has had diverse impact(s) on the
manner in which psychopathology is conceived, on the
definition of who constitutes a psychiatric patient, and
how cognitions, emotions, and behaviors are regarded
and treated. The act of diagnosis in and of itself vali-
dates the very disease it names and defines [44,50]. As
such, current classifications of mental disorders must be
understood, at least to some extent, as “constructed
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denced by the various transmutations within the DSM
throughout its successive editions, rather than incontest-
able facts. The development of the DSM has evidenced
values and assumptions reflective of the Zeitgeist of each
edition. As noted by John Sadler, “...values, not cogni-
tions, determine what we select as ‘important’, ‘crucial’,
‘central’, ‘decisive’,o r‘related’.I no t h e rw o r d s ,v a l u e s
lend structure to the field of attention, predefining back-
ground and foreground, and clustering disparate items
into groups. Consequently, descriptive statements about
psychopathology issue from presupposed value stances
that conceal their own deeper sources, compatibilities,
and incompatibilities” [51].
While such values and assumptions may be neither
inherently “good” nor “bad”, and may be enmeshed
within scientific pursuits of all types [52], awareness of
their existence and of their contribution to the shaping
of what is regarded as scientific knowledge is impera-
tive. Even if we were to presume that scientific knowl-
edge were wholly objective and free of any values or
bias whatsoever, it is nonetheless critical to recognize
that new information adds to, and may subordinate,
older knowledge in an iterative, self-corrective process.
Thus, adherence to a doctrinal stance must be flexible
to adapt to new insights and revision, lest it become
anachronistic and dogmatic. While the changes to the
DSM are based upon scientific strides and humanitar-
ian intent, it’s important to measure such claims by
the purported objectives to improve diagnosis and
treatment in accordance with both psychiatry’sp r o -
fessed medical identity, and the new dimensions of the
discipline and its practice that are enabled by neu-
roscience, neurotechnology, genetics, the social
sciences, and the humanities. If, and how such claims
are realized by the DSM-V remain questions for con-
temporary users of this new edition - and scholars,
researchers and practitioners of psychiatry, the afore-
mentioned fields, and ultimately patients and the pub-
lic to address and decide. Clearly, both the DSM and
psychiatry will remain a work-in-progress, and we
must be ready and responsible for the potential bene-
fits - and possible problems - that such progress may
foster.
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